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• Toward more autonomous and self-sufficient crewed space missions:
Crew Health: Loss of Crew / Loss of Mission threats identified and working to 
mitigate risks
Vehicle Health: focus of much of our engineering efforts with many predictive 
analytical approaches (Hazards Analyses, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Failure Modes 
Effects Analysis, etc.) – mitigations should be built in by the engineering process
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On-Board Anomaly Diagnosis & Response
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Urine Processor 
Assembly Repair
CDRA Repair
Items For Investigation (IFI) Priority 
Level Definition: High
• The anomaly has the potential to cause disabling or fatal injury to 
an ISS crewmember
• The anomaly has the potential to lead to the evacuation of and/or 
loss of the ISS
• The anomaly and/or its resolution potentially impacts the 
assembly, resupply, or crew-rotation launch schedule, or the on-
orbit assembly sequence
• The anomaly has the potential to cause the loss of an ISS 
element, the inability to use an ISS element, the loss of an on-
orbit life sustaining / critical crew health maintenance function, or 
the loss of an emergency system
• The affected hardware has a failure effect criticality of 1
• The affected hardware is a critical item (CI) or a critical spare
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ISS:  High Priority IFIs, Significant Incidents 
Z-Card Incidents 2015
IFI (by closed date)
IFI (open)
Fire/Overheat (Z-Card 2015)
Cooling Loop A Flow Control Valve Anomaly
IFI 8744 12/2013 
On 11DEC2013,  fault detection on Active Thermal Control System (ATCS) was tripped by a 
low temperature measurement of ammonia circulating in Loop A.
Fault detection is used to assure that ammonia temperature is not so cold as to freeze the 
water used in heat exchangers regulating internal ISS environment.
The anomaly required that internal thermal loads be shed to Loop B (redundant system), 
thus reducing internal thermal management redundancy.
Because pump modules of ATCS are external to ISS, trouble shooting is done without 
direct observation of hardware, using indirect sensing and measurements.
Fault was eventually isolated to the Flow Control Valve (Loop A pump module) that mixes 
cool and warm ammonia to achieve set temperature. Valve position found to be biased 
30 deg off from telemetered position.
Work arounds were attempted but unsuccessful, so decision was made to replace pump 
module.
No root cause for bias in valve position was found
Anomaly ultimately required 14 days of 24/7 MER attention; diversion/additional activity by 
the crew; ground teams engineering work-arounds; and 2 EVAs lasting more than 12 
hours in total.
12/2013 Loop A Flow Control Valve Anomaly
12/2013 Loop A FCV Anomaly—Timeline
Crew
• Notified.  Assist ground in 
shedding thermal loads.
• Halt/move experiments requiring 
cooling of bio samples.
• Assist in trouble shooting.
• Assist EVA planning. 
• EVA prep
• Install contingency jumper
• EVA prep
• EVA #1 (5 hr, 28 min)
• EVA #2 (7 hrs, 30 min)
• Return to normal config/ops.
Ground
• Under-temp shuts down Cooling Loop A. Pump recovery started; 
internal thermal loads moved to Loop B.
• Loop A pump successfully restarted. Valve response and flow rates 
characterized. Temp remains low.
• Troubleshooting begins. Full valve response tested. 30 deg error from 
commanded position identified.
• Pump power cycled. Tests re-done with same results. EVA planning for 
pump module repair/replace starts.
• Line heaters started to raise temps but insufficient (i.e., work-around 
failed).
• Attempt to use downstream isolation valve to control temp (i.e., 
ammonia flow). Testing continues for 2 days. Software patch developed 
for control.
• Isolation valve testing halted/pump shutdown to up load patch. Tests 
continue.
• Re-integration of internal loads, outlet temps still unstable. Insufficient 
control authority using isolation valve (i.e., work-around failed).
• Orb-1 Cygnus launch delayed. Pump to be replaced by EVA. 
Troubleshooting stopped.
• Loop A shutdown for contingency jumper installation. Restarted.
• EVA prep –pump module SN04 to be replaced with SN06
• EVA #1
• EVA #2.  
• Loop A re-pressurized and returned to normal ops. (MER 14 days 24/7)
Day/Time
GMT 345/14:20
GMT 345/15:00
GMT 346/8:00
GMT 346/21:00
GMT 347/16:00
GMT 347/22:00
GMT 351/07:00
GMT 352/12:00
GMT 352 
GMT 353/15:00
GMT 354
GMT 355
GMT 357
GMT 359
12/2013 Loop A FCV Anomaly—PM Replacement EVAs
Pump Module
Loop A ETCS UnderTemp FDIR Shutdown C:\kswoods\FY14_FSO\PM_FCV_FT\PM_FCV.caf 12/16/2013
Loop A ETCS Undertemp
FDIR Shutdown
PM_FCV
Operator-induced failure
G046
Temperature transient
G001
ECTS leak to space
G002
Temperature sensor failure
G047
FCV Failure
G004
Closed Loop Control Failure
G006
FCV Unresponsive to
commands
G007
FCV Offset as compared to
spool position
G008
S1 MDM error
G010
RVDT offset
G012
Shorted or open RVDT
sensor line
G020
Shorted RVDT sensor coil
G021
Electrical short due to
degraded potting
G044
NH3 ingress due to internal
leak changes coil resistance
G045
Firmware calculation error
G039
Software program corruption
G040
EPROM corruption
G015
EPROM Component failure
G016
SEU (single event upset)
G017
Charge depletion due to age
G048
Calibration data corruption
G041
EPROM corruption
G015
Signal conditioning failure
G035
RVDT Sense electronics
failure
G036
RVDT Drive electronics
failure
G037
Physical Misalignment of
RVDT sensor coils as
compared to rotor
G050
Physical misalignment of
RVDT transformer core as
compared to shaft
G051
Spool offset
G011
Shaft slippage
G018
Slop between spline teeth
G028
Jumping spline
G029
Magnetic coupling"jumped
poles"
G019
Loosening of spline pin
G027
Spool Bearing seizes
restricting FCV motion
G049
FCV Internal Seal Damage
G030
FOD within ammonia flow
path (hung on window)
redirects flow
G014
FCV failed "radiator full flow"
G009
No bypass flow due to bypass
valve fails closed
G005
Environment drives loop
below minimum operational
temperature
G003
12/2013 Loop A FCV Anomaly—Engineering Products
• Chits (Mission Action Requests):
 VIPER Short-Term Plasma Forecast for PM R&R EVAs 
24, 25 & 26 
 S1P1 DBCL for ETCS Loop-A Return Isolation Valve
 Command from Scratch Request for ETCS Loop A 
Radiator Return Valve Positioning 
 US EVA 24, 25, & 26 S1 Pump Module R&R Vent 
Coordination 
 Operating Loop A PCVP at High Outlet Temperatures 
 US EVA 24, 25, 26 Depress/Repress of EATCS Loop A 
 Request for Analysis of ATA Jumper Line Hydrostatic Lock 
Constraints 
• EFNs (Electronic Flight Notes):
• ISS MER ART Summaries, 1-6
• Loop A Configuration and System Impacts 
• Loop A FCV Mapping 
• Loop A FCV Anomaly impacts to crew 
• Loop A PCVP Power Cycle for FCV Troubleshooting
• Contingency Increase Temperature-Closed Radiator 
Return Valve 
• Contingency Increase Temperature using Line Heaters 
• Thermal Mitigation via Partial Radiator Isolation Valve 
Closure 
• Loop A NWF Big Picture Words 
• LOOP A “Warmjump” Tests
• Valve Characterization Tests 
• Shutdown and Restart Procedures for FCV-degraded 
Config
• S1-1 MDM Patch Load 
• Spare Pump Module Checkout 
• PM Removal Procedure 
contributor
insufficient data
non-contributor
PM FCV Fault Tree Analysis
12/2013 Loop A FCV Anomaly—Background
The Active Thermal Control System (ATCS) is the main permanent active heat rejection system on the 
station. It acquires, transports, and rejects excess heat from all U.S. and international partner modules 
except the Russian modules. Two external loops (Loops A and B) circulate ammonia to transport heat 
and cool equipment. 
Pump modules (PM) for the two loops are situated outside the pressurized part of the station on the 
station’s main truss. They provide circulation, loop pressurization, and temperature control of the 
ammonia. The Pump & Control Valve Package (PCVP) provides flow control. The Flow Control Valve 
(FCV) located within the PCVP regulates the temperature of the ammonia. The FCV mixes “cool” 
ammonia exiting the radiators with “warm” ammonia that has bypassed the radiators. 
Each Loop is CRIT1R. A failure doesn’t place the crew in any immediate danger but it does remove 
redundancy, which could make a second failure a far more serious concern. 
When major abnormalities develop, some equipment is moved to the other loop for cooling and other 
equipment powered down.
Historically, Loop A pump modules have been problematic: e.g., in July 2010, the pump module completely 
failed and needed 3 EVAs to be replaced. 
 the first indication of an anomaly in 2010 was an over-current alarm that tripped  and awoke the crew 
 retrospectively, anomalous trends were seen in pump pressure data as early as 2008.  Current spikes were also 
seen.
 there is no record of the 2010 Loop A pump failure in the summary of  “high priority” IFIs
• There were initially 4 pump module spares on-orbit; 2 have now been used and one additional spare 
delivered in 2018
• PRA results show the contribution to overall EVAC risk (1 in 32) is 1 in 320 from ATCS 
CDRA CO2 Removal Rate Anomalies
IFI 2211 JUL-AUG/2006
Concern over Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) performance was raised when a cursory comparison of 
JUL2006 flight data showed different ppCO2 profiles for time periods when CDRA was running without 
support from Shuttle LiOH canisters. A subsequent CDRA performance test in AUG2006 also indicated CO2
removal performance degradation. (See yellow highlighted regimes in following plot.)
The target partial pressure of CO2 on ISS is ~3.5 mm Hg (compared to < 1 mm Hg on earth). During periods of 
performance degradation noted above, the ppCO2 increased to 5-6mm Hg. (Mild symptoms related to ppCO2
(e.g., headache) don’t begin until >15 mmHg.)
There are 2 CDRA’s on board the USOS—they are redundant systems but they can’t be run concurrently to 
reduce CO2 because too much power is drawn and heat generated. Additional capacity is maintained 
through LiOH canisters. In the Russian segment, the Vozdukh system scrubs CO2.
Verifying CDRA performance by analysis and review of on-orbit data requires the comparison of all variables 
affecting ppCO2. Changes in configuration (e.g., fan ops) and loads (e.g., no. of crew) complicates the 
understanding of performance. There were ~9 configuration changes between APR and SEP 2006, including 
a check valve failure.
Investigation did not conclusively determine whether or not CDRA was performing normally due to the numerous 
variables influencing CO2 removal performance evaluation. 
The reduced CO2 removal noted in JUL2006 was probably due to a combination of clogged sock filter, Vozdukh
underperformance, lack of shuttle booster fan, and LiOH usage. For that seen in AUG2006, the CDRA air 
inlet flow was found to be low due to an inadvertently disconnected duct that allowed humid/warm air to 
enter the CDRA. This, coupled with the clogged sock filter, appears to have resulted in the observed 
behavior.
Anomaly resolution required significant data analysis by ground and troubleshooting/inspection by crew over 2 
mo.
JUL-AUG/2006 CDRA CO2 Removal Rate Anomalies
Suspected times when Vozdukh 
may not have been controlling CO2
CDRA Performance test 
(duct problem – high inlet 
temp and high blower delta 
pressure).
ULF1.1 12A 13
S
CDRA operation due to 
Vozdukh valve failure
CDRA performance 
nominal at this time
11 July, sudden blower delta
pressure change
Vozdukh Performance test
2 Crew 3 Crew
CDRA operation due to 
Vozdukh shutdown for 
maintenance
Vozdukh Ops
20 July, Vozdukh to manual mode
31 July, swap to STBD CCAA
29 July, CDRA check valve failure
Attachment 2; Carbon Dioxide Partial Pressure Performance Summary
CDRA CO2 removal 
degradation periods 
of concern
JUL-AUG/2006 CDRA CO2 Removal Rate Anomalies—ppCO2 data
GMT DATE EVENT
2006/134-
140
5/14/200
6 -
5/20/200
6
CDRA operation in May 2006 due to failed Vozdukh valve
2006/187 7/6/2006 ULF1.1 docking
2006/192
7/11/200
6
CDRA check valve failure (valve cleared in 2 half cycles and dual bed ops 
resumed)
2006/193
7/12/200
6 Sudden change in CDRA blower delta pressure
2006/196
7/15/200
6 ULF1.1 undocking
2006/210
7/29/200
6 CDRA check valve failure (valve did not clear)
2006/212
7/31/200
6 Swap to Starboard CCAA and sudden CDRA inlet temperature increase
2006/226
8/14/200
6 Vozdukh performance test begins
2006/227
8/15/200
6 Vozdukh performance test ends
2006/233
8/21/200
6 CDRA performance test begins
2006/235
8/23/200
6 CDRA performance test ends
2006/248 9/5/2006 CDRA Starboard process air inlet hose discovered to be detached
2006/254
9/11/200
6 12A docking
2006/260
9/17/200
6 12A undocking
2006/269
9/26/200
6 CDRA Starboard process air inlet hose repaired
2006/269
9/26/200
6 CDRA sock filter cleaned - near normal delta pressure recovered
JUL-AUG/2006 CDRA CO2 Removal Rate Anomalies
ATTACHMENT #5; CDRA Troubleshooting Steps
1
2*
3a
4
5
3b
6
inlet temp
change?
Perform as early as this week
(independent of 12A launch 
date)
Perform as early as Monday, 9/11/06
(assuming 12A launch slip to at least late 
Sep, otherwise perform post-12A)
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C. Byrne, x33099, 9/27/06
S6 process air line had become disconnected.  Temporary 
reconnection restored CDRA Inlet Temp to expected level.  
More permanent connection implemented on 9/26/06.
CDRA sock filter maintenance performed on 9/26/06.  
Loose zeolite was found and cleaned up.  Delta P is back 
to expected level.  Stuck check valve has not cleared as of 
9/27/06.
JUL-AUG/2006 CDRA CO2 Removal Rate Anomalies—Troubleshooting 
1. Operate P6 CCAA fan, look for 
changes in CDRA inlet temp 
(Ground command)
2. Cycle Process Air Valve with 
P6 CCAA fan on (Ground 
command)
3a. Inspect process air conn. at 
S6 rack interface (5-10 min 
crew time)
3b. Inspect process air conn. at 
AR rack interface (40 min 
crew time)
4. Swap from S6 CCAA to P6
CCAA (45 min crew time)
5. Inspect AR process air conn. 
at S6 CCAA HX (1.5 hour 
crew time)
6. Inspect & clean CDRA sock 
filter (30 min crew time)
)^g
Figure 2. Structure of a LiOH canister. Ruler is
16cm for scale.'
 
BED 1 Inlet air from the cabin flows into CDRABed 1. Because the zeolite material will react
DESICCANTBED 062A654RSVN BED
UOSOF2BING) NESOfDING) EFECTRGAL preferentially with ambient moisture over
atmospheric COz, the incoming CO2-laden air
AM AV9 must be desiccated prior to zeolite exposure.
IAIR t Incoming air is first flowed through theMT
i desiccant portion of Bed 1 before it is routed
RFT RN B^avrR;` through the motive blower and into the zeolite
1 portion of Bed 2 for CO, removal. Scrubbed
air is then flowed outward over the previ-
ously saturated desiccant portion of Bed 2.
OESIUCANI BED CO2A0SORBENT BED '-
(DESORBOO) (ADSORD INO) absorbing previously removed moisture and
BED 2 returning it to the cabin environment as thescrubbed air leaves the CDRA. Meanwhile,
Airwith CO2, H2O »», Bed EvaCUMOA the adsorbent portion of Bed 1 is isolated from
Airw11CO2 no w;lp Air Savec „„, ,
.^rwirho,^ecaa.xao 
,,,,,,sp-.„_ both the desiccant portion of Bed 1 and the
arw^xao (no COZ) cabin environment. The isolated adsorbent
portion of Bed 1 is exposed to space vacuum
Figure 1. CDRA schematic. Architecture of the CDRA, and heated, causing the adsorbed CO, to be
showing desiccant-adsorbent Bed 2 adsorbing CO 2 from the released and vented to space. When the ad-
cabin and desiccant-adsorbent Bed 1 desorbing to the space sorbent portion of Bed 2 becomes saturated,
vacuum.2 the valves are reconfigured and the two beds
switch roles; i.e., Bed 1 adsorbs and Bed 2
desorbs to space. When the valves close, the bed that is transitioning from adsorbing to desorbing will be full of air
at ambient pressure. If this air is immediately exposed to space vaccum, it will be lost overboard. To prevent loss of
air inside the bed, the air save pump brings the bed to initial vaccum and returns the removed air to the cabin. Thus.
CDRA effectively pumps CO2 overboard without losing significant amounts of cabin air.
B. Vozdukh
Vozdukh is the primary CO 2 removal system for the Russian segment of ISS. It operates on a similar principal to
CDRA, with the exception that it has three beds and uses an
amine-based adsorbent rather than a zeolite. This paper is
written from the standpoint of USOS operations; therefore
because Vozdukh is a Russian system, it will not be
discussed in technical detail in this paper. ^.
C. Lithium Hydroxide
These cylindrical metal canisters are filled with LiOH,
with a central annulus to allow airflow. They are installed in
a blower system that provides motive airflow through both
the can and the L10H contained within. The exterior and
interior circumferential surfaces of the cylinder are
perforated, and airflow moves from the inner annulus into
the L10H material before it exhausts through the outer
perimeter of the canister. L10H reacts with ambient
humidity and CO2 to create lithium carbonate (LhCO3).
Unlike the zeolite and amine materials used in the CDRA and
Vozdukh respectively; the conversion of LiOH to Li 2CO3 is
permanent: i.e., the L10H canisters have a limited consumable
life. The L10H canisters on board the space shuttle are
changed at regular intervals to provide fresh L10H for
reaction. The consumable nature of LiOH canisters means
that a stock of canisters must be loaded aboard the vehicle
prior to a mission according to planned CO 2 scrubbing
requirements, and L10H canister use must be closely
rationed during flight.
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
' C ' . <  
The D/A bed ORU is a critical component of the CDRA 
system for removing cafbon dioxide. There are two D/A 
bed ORU's per CDRA system. Each of the ORU's was 
verified via system level Protoflight testing. By 
performing the verification at an integrated level, 
individual ORU's need not be tested. To support ORU- 
level Acceptance testing of the D/A bed spares, the 
program must develop ORU-level tests to use in lieu of 
the existing system-level CDRA tests. Figure 2 depicts 
the D/A bed ORU. 
' . Two CDRA systems were produced for the ISS program. 
One CDRA system resides in the ISS U.S. Destiny 
Laboratory module. The second CDRA system is 
schedule for delivery for installation into Node 3. The ISS 
CDRA system supplements the Russian Vozdukh 
carbon dioxide removal system when more than three 
crewmembers are on board. On-board Lithium Hydroxide 
canisters supplement Vozdukh and CDRA CO, removal 
capabilities when needed. Figure 1 depicts the ISS flight 
CDRA. 
Figure 1. Carbon Dioxide Removal 
Assembly (CDRA) 
The CDRA continuously removes 6 person-equivalents 
of CO, when operating with both C02 removal beds (dual 
beds) functioning. The minimum ISS carbon dioxide 
removal rate is based on the following equation for 
human equivalent unit (HEU) with the carbon dioxide 
partial pressure ranging from 2.0 to 3.9 mmHg: 
Eq 1 HEUs 1.723 * (pp CO, mmHg) - 0.37975 
Where 1 HEU is approximately 1 kg CO, /day 
Eq 2 C02 removal rate (Ibhr) 2 0.1 58 * (pp C02, mmHg) - 
0.035 
Each CDRA system includes 6 major orbital replacement 
units (ORU), including: 
Selector Valve ORU 
Blower / Precooler ORU 
Two-Stage Pump ORU 
Heater Controller ORU 
Desiccant / Adsorbent (D/A) Bed ORU 
Pump Fan Motor Controller (PFMC) ORU 
Figure 2. DesiccantlAdsorbent 
Bed ORU 
ISS CDRA 
During the past four years, the ISS CDRA system has 
operated with varying degrees of success. There have 
been several approaches to troubleshooting the CDRA 
system aimed at developing interim solutions that 
minimize astronaut time required to implement interim 
operational solutions. Failure analysis of a returned flight 
D/A bed ORU revealed a failure of the desiccant and 
sorbent containment design. This seal failure allowed 
some zeolite particles to be circulated with the 
movement of process air. While the loss of some zeolite 
particles does not impact CDRA system CO, removal 
performance, the particulates did affect operations of 
some downstream components resulting in malfunctions 
of the air save pump, D/A bed check valve and selector 
valve. (2) A major D/A bed redesign was implemented to 
alleviate the containment problem, but the modification 
requires an extended period of time to implement. As a 
3 
JUL-AUG/2006 CDRA CO2 Removal Rate Ano alies—Background
The interactions between the components of the ISS 
Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS)
JUL-AUG/2006 CDRA CO2 Removal Rate Anomalies—Background
ISS:  High Priority IFIs, Significant Incidences 
2002 201820102004 2006 2008 2012 2014 2016
Z-Card Incidents 2015
IFI (by closed date)
IFI (open)
Fire/Overheat (Z-Card 2015)
C&DH                                                    ✓
C&T                                                          ✓
✓
ECLSS ✓ ✓ ✓✓✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓✓ ✓ ✓
✓
EPS                     ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
GN&C      ✓
Prop                                                        ✓
TCS              ✓ ✓ ✓
EVA              ✓ ✓ ✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓✓
✓✓✓✓ ✓
EVR        ✓ ✓
✓
SARJ                                                                                        ✓ ✓
S&M        ✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
CHeCS ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓✓
✓
Assmbly ✓ ✓ ✓
Safety                                                  ✓
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Enabling Crew Problem-Solving
Ground Control
Crew
Automation
Hours
On-Board Problem 
Solving for Potential 
Loss-of-Crew / Loss-
of-Vehicle Anomalies
On-Board Support 
Systems
Trouble-Shooting
• Monitoring and Detection
• Diagnosia
• Solution Dev and Eval
• Solution Implementation 
and Verification
• Resolution 
DocumentationDecision Support
Execution
Support
Crew
Current MCC Functions 
to transfer to Crew
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On-board self-
scheduling 
during 2017 ISS 
Crew 
Autonomous 
Scheduling Test 
(CAST).
Current Command 
& Control 
approach wit ~150 
ground based 
experts conducting 
most aspects of 
mission 
operations.
Enabling Crew Autonomy
Ground Control
Crew
Automation
Hours
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How Not to End up Making Things Harder?
Shuttle Main Engine Maintenance on the Ground, 1995
Avoiding the Autonomy Paradox
The Autonomy Paradox
(Blackhurst, Gresham & Stone, 2011)
• In the summed experience of DoD, Autonomy investments lead to increased costs
• Autonomy doesn’t get rid of humans, it changes their roles 
• Unless attention is paid to how the new intelligent systems will work with humans, 
they will end up making the task more difficult
As machine intelligence 
advances, the need for 
functional integration with 
human capabilities increases
This won’t happen by itself --
needs to be driven by research 
that informs engineering 
requirements
0 50 100 150 200 250
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
PRACAs: First Five Years
ECLSS CHeCS C&T C&DH
ATCS S&M EPS EEE
0 5 10 15
2014
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2016
2017
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PRACAs: Last Five Years
ECLSS CHeCS C&T C&DH
ATCS S&M EPS EEE
*
* Excludes EVR, Environ, M&P, FCS, GN&C, Payload, and RCS for comparison purposes
The Significant Incidents and Close Calls, Z-Chart
• Charts present visual overview of major losses and close calls 
spanning the history of the International Space Station to heighten 
awareness of the risks that must be managed as human space flight 
continues to advance.
• Events on the chart are organized by flight phase and ordered 
chronologically within each phase.
• Three types of important events are highlighted: loss of crew, crew 
injury, and related or recurring events. 
• Events with one or more crew fatalities are considered a loss of crew and highlighted in red. 
• Crew injury or illness and/or loss of vehicle or mission is designated by orange shading. 
• Related or recurring events are grouped together and set apart by yellow shaded boxes. These 
events have occurred repeatedly, are similar in nature, and may continue to occur today.
MCC

MER
